

How Are They Elected? Vote Buying And General Election In Ogan Ilir District, South Sumatera Province

Mery Yanti¹, Alamsyah²

¹Department of Sociology, Universitas Sriwijaya Palembang, Indonesia

² Department of Public Administration, Universitas Sriwijaya Palembang, Indonesia

Mery.yanti@fisip.unsri.ac.id, alamsyah78@fisip.unsri.ac.id

Abstract

This article designed to examine patronage practice in the 2014 general election in Ogan Ilir district, South Sumatera Province, Indonesia, before and after election in one electoral area (Ogan Ilir 1). We apply Nine Step to Victory (Alamsyah, 2015) framework to achieve this goal. Our key informants are some legislative candidates and their brokerage or winning team at various level. Primary data gathered through depth interview and secondary data collected from the government institution. This data will be analyzed using interactive model (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 1994). Drawing on the qualitative approach, we find that, before election day, all candidates in this area practicing vote buying and patronage to get political support from the voters. A form of patronage dominated by club goods, and cash transfer (transport allowance, communication and consumption cost, and vote buying). We do not find incumbency candidate who is practicing fork barrel. After election day, especially when the winner candidates, has been working as a legislator, he has an obligation to continuing patronage through informal and cultural networking (personal or community event). In this various event, he must deliver goods, services, or money to the people (as an individual or group). Our results are strengthening the previous finding that all candidates have begun implementing patronage strategy when they are recruiting the winning team, campaign, and realize vote buying. Family, especially extended family, and friendship is the primary foundation for all candidates to build brokerage (the winning team) structure. All candidates also using “by name by address” strategy to guide vote-buying practice. We discuss this finding, showing limitation and agenda for the research on this topic.

Keyword: *General Election, Patronage, Clientelism, Vote Buying, Local Politics*

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<i>Surel Corespondensi</i>	: jovani.audra@gmail.com

Introduction

Since 1999, Indonesia entering into a new stage and build significant progress in electoral reform. For example, Indonesia has adopted the multiparty system, an individual quota for women in the fixed list, direct election as a mechanism to choose the president, the governor, the

mayor, and the regent, and strengthening the Agency of General Elections Supervisions. However, general elections are, especially regional head elections, are expensive. The rich people can only enter it. Indonesia also remains a severe problem with political behavior (the elites and the voters) in electoral politics, for example, vote buying, vote trading, and political dowry which is expressing patronage as a part of political culture.

The 2014 General Election is the fourth general election after New Order regime. It has been realized peacefully. However, one of the issues that highlighting by the mass media is the phenomenon of money politics. Tempo magazine, for example, publishing some news related to money politics (Burase, 2014; Fitria, 2014). These stories tell us how the police officer confiscating hundreds of million rupiah from people who alleged will spread money before or within election day, the role of brokers to connecting candidate to the voters, and several citizens who reject money politics. In South Sumatera province, there is several demonstrations who demanding for recalculation and re-voting in several points in Palembang City due to the ballot papers problems (Sumatera Ekspres, April 12, 2014). However, in general, political and social stability after the 2014 General Election remains conducive.

From a scientific point of view, media coverage on money politics means that it is an empirical phenomenon. However, media does not give fully analysis to this event. It is why this research is dedicated to mapping the pattern and variations of patronage politics in the 2014 General Elections. Theoretically, many scholars have been using patronage as theoretical framework to describing and analyzing Indonesian politics. It had replacing identity politics perspective that growing faster in the early of decentralization era (Erb et al., 2005, pp. 149-179; Faucher, 2005, pp. 132-148; Picard, 2005, pp. 116-131). In Indonesian context, off course, identity politics cannot be abandoning. However, as Aspinall (2011, pp. 289-319) noted, patronage is a trump for identity politics. Patronage could be occurrence at state level (Fukuoka, 2013, pp. 991-1013; Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 43) or society level (Antlöv, 2003, p. 206). Political elite and ordinary people have the same opportunity to become subject of patronage (Allen, 2014, pp. 221-245).

Desk study shows that clientelism and patronage, especially vote buying, is not happening in Indonesia only, but also in many countries, for example, Malaysia (Weiss, 2014), Latin America (Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013, pp. 609-619; Desposato, 2006, pp. 62-80; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012, pp. 202-217), Ghana (Ichino & Nathan, 2013, pp. 428-441; Weghorst &

Lindberg 2013, pp. 717-734), and Colombia (Rueda, 2017, pp. 163-177). It could be caused by low-income rate (Brusco et al., 2004, pp. 66-88; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, pp. 568-583), quality of democracy (Keefer, 2007, pp. 804-821), patron-client relationship and weakness of government institution (Manzetti & Wilson, 2016, pp. 949-970),

For Hicken (2011, pp. 289-310), clientelism have many consequences. It will affect democracy functions, citizens attitudes toward democracy, the capacity of government to produce public policy, party system, levels of rent seeking, public sector inefficiencies, corruption and perception of corruption, politicization of bureaucracy, development of political institutions, and accountability. However, political participation, access to information, voter education campaign could reduce clientelism, patronage or vote buying practice in general election (Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009, pp. 292-305).

Previous study show that electoral politics, especially at grassroots level, in Indonesia has been dominated by patronage praxis (Aspinall & Mada, 2015). Current finding on this topic is very varied. For example, Aspinall (2014, pp. 545-570) was developed brokerage typology based on candidate resources ownership and broker subjective perception on candidate opportunity to winning election. Allen (2015, pp. 73-85) argue that in the electoral districts where the state played a dominant role in the economy, voters and candidates tended to form the type of patron-client bonds that resulted in high levels of preference voting. However, a few studies give attention to patronage praxis at grassroots level after election day. We are, then, attempt to elaborate this topic more deeply.

We define patronage as exchange good and service between voter and candidate to get political support (Aspinall, 2013). It could be deliver through programmatic or non-programmatic approach (Stoke, 2011). In anthropology view, exchange is always containing reciprocity norm. Reciprocity means that exchange good and service always based on trust, mutual obligation, and voluntary. If A give something to B based on voluntary, then B has obligation to give A something else based on voluntary norm (Eriksen, 2004). In economic literature, exchange mechanism similar to the supply-demand principle. Smith (1776) believed that supply-demand law is the best mechanism in the world to make welfare society.

Allen (2015, pp. 73-85) argue that in the electoral districts where the state played a dominant role in the economy, voters and candidates tended to form the type of patron-client bonds that resulted in high levels of preference voting. A few studies give attention to patronage

praxis at grassroots level after election day. This article, then, is attempting to elaborate this topic more deeply. The research question is how to explain the candidate strategy to winning the 2014 General Elections in Ogan Ilir districts? Does the candidate have similar or different strategy to get political support from the voters? Do they still use patronage to maintain positive relationship with their constituency?

We utilize the Nine-Step to Victory (Alamsyah, 2015) framework to understanding patronage praxis at the grassroots level. According to this framework, every candidate, based on their cognitive competency, develop an imaginary scaffold as a guide to winning the elections. This stage consists of nine steps: securing the nomination, mapping a victory strategy, forming a team, *sosialisasi*, recruiting and training witnesses, using the quiet period, monitoring vote tabulation as it moves through the system, monitoring the result, and getting ready for the legal challenge. However, the last stage is optional and usually work when there is the dispute on the general election result.

Methods

We use qualitative approach and case study design (Yin, 2009) to guide research process. This study was conducted in Ogan Ilir District, South Sumatera Province, Indonesia, and focused on one electoral district (Ogan Ilir 1) which containing three sub-districts: Indralaya, South Indralaya, and North Indralaya. We use purposive methods to select research informant. The researcher uses purposive methods to select research sample. The informant consists of (a) five candidates who have status as incumbent legislator; (b) five candidates who have status as non-incumbent legislator; (c) ten people who helped candidates as campaign team. Political praxis in Indonesia called campaign team as a successful team or the winning team. We use depth interview to collecting primary data. Secondary data was gathered from government institution, especially Ogan Ilir District of General Election Commission. Data will be analyzed qualitatively using interactive model (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 1994).

Result and Discussion

a. Patronage before election day

1. Securing nomination

To become a candidate, someone must be entering her name into the *Daftar Calon Tetap* (DCT, fixed list candidate) which is decided by party officer. Each political party have internal mechanism to prepare DCT. All political party tend to, except PBB and PKPI, fill out their DCT with maximum number (total number of seats in an electoral district). In 2014 general election, Indonesia still adopt majority system. Consequently, candidate number in DCT is not important. It is no longer a critical factor to determine someone as the winner or the loser. “Don’t think about number. If you want to be a winner, go to the people and give them money in the right time”, said WM, incumbent candidate from PDI-P (interview, 08/09/2015).

In this study, several key informants receive number one in the DCT because they are political party official at district level (for example: AS, FH, and HM). We do not find praxis where party official sell and/or candidate purchase number within the DCT in this phase. All party official also perceives women quota (30% from total DCT) as administrative prerequisite. The candidate does not worry to fail getting number in the DCT. “Our party has many cadres. We can count them one by one. However, few people have a spirit, braveness, and resources to fight in general election”, said KMT, non-incumbent candidate from PAN (interview, 10/08/2015).

2. Mapping a victory strategy

As an electoral district, Ogan Ilir 1 consist of three sub-districts: North Indralaya (16 villages), Indralaya (20 villages), and South Indralaya (14 villages). Half of Ogan Ilir 1 has grown as urban area because Indralaya sub-district has role as the capital city of Ogan Ilir district. Conversely, South Indralaya still appears as rural area. In term of ethnicity, population of South Indralaya sub-district has dominated by *Meranjat* and *PegaganUlu* ethnic. North Indralaya and Indralaya sub-district is inhabited by *Sakatiga* ethnic, *PegaganIlir* ethnic, and migrants people who live in transmigration village and urban housing area.

Based on self-identification through interview, each candidate represents a particular ethnic (see Table 1). All candidates do not use ethnicity as entry point to catch the voters. However, each candidate recognizes that, in some villages, there are voters who vote based on ethnicity consideration. This situation is representing by some jargon: *wangtobo* (Pegagan Ulu ethnic), *urangdiri* (Meranjat ethnic), and *urang kite* (Sakatiga ethnic) that indicating voters' in-group feeling.

Table 1 Key informant composition based on village, sub-district, and ethnicity

No.	Candidate initial	Village	Sub-district	Ethnicity
1.	AS	Sukaraja Baru	Indralaya Selatan	Pegagan Ulu
2.	HM	Muara Kamal	Indralaya	Pegagan Ilir
3.	WM	MuaraPenimbung	Indralaya	Pegagan Ilir
4.	KMT	Indralaya	Indralaya	Sakatiga
5.	FH	Lorok	Indralaya	Pegagan Ilir
6.	EPU	Meranjat	Indralaya Selatan	Meranjat

Source: primary data

When mapping a victory strategy, some candidate defines her village where she was born, and/or she grew up as vote bank. In these villages, candidates feel that they still have extended family and close friend. In Ogan Ilir district, a person is considered as a part of extended family if she has *dulur* (sibling), *misan* (first cousin), *mindu*(second cousin), *mentelu* (third cousin), and *seraikunyit* (fourth cousin) status to the others person(Alamsyah, 2015, pp. 155-156).All candidates, besides consanguinity, also see matrimony relation as part of extended family. Trust is the primary reason for candidate to functioning their extended family as vote base and political machine. All candidates, then, use personal network member of their extended family to expand their success team in Ogan Ilir 1 electoral district.

Among the candidates who were interviewed, only AS and WM were not using family networks as political machine. AS (non-incumbent candidate from NasDem) use party infrastructure and social organization (in this case: *Karang Taruna Ogan Ilir*) as a

political machine. AS has experience as the chairman of *Karang Taruna Ogan Ilir* (KTOI). Half of NasDem official at district, sub-district, and village level is recruited from peoples who have been experience as KTOI activist at district, sub-district, and village level. He, then, uses organization sentiment to mobilize, especially youth voter in the village level.

Meanwhile, WM (incumbent candidates from PDIP) uses party infrastructure because he believed that there is Sukarno loyalist who live in Ogan Ilir 1. He does not see her village as vote bank. "I cannot expect too much from MuaraKamal village. Many candidates (from other party) who come from this village. In this situation, the voter will be dispersed based on the extended family of each candidate. It is why I focused on the outside of my village. In the outside, I focused on to approaching the voters who are still loyal to the Bull logo and Sukarno figure", said WM (interview, 09/08/2015).

Although HM, KMT, and FH use extended family as vote bank, they also seek votes in other villages. They are understanding very well that it is impossible to get 60% votes from their village. "My previous experience show that I am only gets 10% - 25% of total *DaftarPemilihTetap* (DPT, fixed list voter) thorough extended family. I must seekvotes from other villages. However, political works become easier because I already have vote bank in my village", said HM (interview, 30/09/2015).

3. Forming a team

It is impossible to reach voters without a team. In Ogan Ilir 1, all candidates, including candidate who has position as a chairman of political party in district level, do not use party infrastructure as the primary source of their winning team. They are also recruit some ordinary people, primarily in village level, as member of winning team. Recruitment of this people based on social networking such as friendship, professional relationship, acquaintances, or part of extended family networking. Friendship and extended family network have high trust value than professional relationship and acquaintances. When a candidate does not have social networking in certain area, then she will fail to approach the voters.

Ogan Ilir 1 has 50 villages. Each candidate does not put the winning team in all villages. They choose and determine targeted villages carefully. In this phase, each candidate will collect information about total number of voters in the village and how

many candidates have social networking to those villages. Based on this information, then, there will be two typologies of village: *desabertuan* (owned village) and *desatakbertuan* (un-owned village). The villages, as shown in Table 1, is owned village because there are many candidates come from these villages. Each candidate need extra energy to infiltrate owned village, because the owner lives or has strength social networking in this village.

Some candidates, for example AS (non-incumbent candidate from NasDem) and FH (non-incumbent candidate from Gerindra), create the structure of winning team in line with division of administrative area (i.e.: district, sub-district, village, neighborhood, and polling station). Other candidates create more flexible structure. For example, HM (incumbent candidate from PAN) and KMT, does not have team at sub-district level. They are recruit people at village level and control it directly.

Practice of patronage is beginning to happen when candidates forming a winning team. The simplest form of patronage is provision of transportation and communication funds for winning team member during campaign process. All candidate who were interviewed did not give honorarium to their winning team. They only give Rp50,000 – Rp100,000 per person to their winning team as one-way transportation and communication fund. There is no regular schedule for candidate to give this fund. It is depending on work load that carry out by winning team at particular area. Simply put, no job no money. Other form of patronage is, as AS (non-incumbent candidate from NasDem) practiced in one of the villages in South Indralaya sub-district, give fresh money to farmer groups which consist of 40 households as group member.

During campaign time, voter will demand anything to candidates (i.e.: sport club uniform, football, volleyball, uniform for women club, fund for special event, and etc). For incumbent candidate, they will respond this request as long as it is considered as rational demand. However, KMT tend to ignore these demands. “I have been twice become candidate. Based on previous experience, I know that such assistance would be forgotten quickly by voters. Voters are easier to remember final touch even its value does not big”, said KMT (interview, 08/10/2015).

4. Sosialisasi

One the team was formed, the next step was *sosialisasi*, which basically means “promotion”. The core task was getting the candidate’s name, face, party affiliation and number on the ballot known by target voters (using sample ballot paper to show them how to locate the candidate was especially important as voting day neared) (Alamsyah, 2015, pp. 147-173). All candidates see that banners and billboards are still important as an instrument for candidate promotion. However, if we compare to 2004 and 2009 general election, there is no “banners war” in 2014 general election.

Several candidates still realize closed and limited meeting to the voters in village level. The number of voter who invited to this meeting is very varied (between 10-30 people). Although, candidate has money to make a big meeting (more than 50 people), but their winning team at village level tend to reject this event. “More people means more responsibility. If I invite more people, for example 50 people, then a half of them is missed (do not choose my candidate) in election day, it will destroy my relationship to candidate. So, little is better as long as it does not move to another candidate”, said Hepi, winning team of PPP candidate (interview, 27/06/2015).

EPU (non-incumbent candidate from Golkar) realize closed meeting three times. “I was invited to meeting three times by EPU. Closed meeting was held at him family house. The number of participant between 20 – 30 people. Each participant will receiveRp50,000 as transportation fund. Other example is Bi’ul (winning team of PD candidate) who realize a closed meeting without attending by his candidate. “I meet with 50 youth people in my house. We discuss their plan to watch a football match at Sriwijaya Stadium (headquarter of Sriwijaya Football Club) in Palembang. I said that my candidate will give full support for your plan, but you must choose him in election day. *Alhamdulillah*, my candidate gives them two bus and economy ticket for 100 youth people” (interview, 06/09/2015).

KMT does not realize closed meeting. “We have smart card. Everyone who has a smart card will protect by mortality insurance and received assistance business fund (between Rp5,000,000 – Rp100,000,000). This program is fully funded by RusdiTahar (member of Sumatera Selatan House of Representative) through aspiration fund”, said Teguh (winning team KMT) (interview, 07/06/2015). WM, incumbent candidate from PDIP, is also does not realize closed meeting because he doesn’t trust this event will

determine election result. “In my mind, closed meeting is ineffective and high costly. The most important thing in election is the final touch” said WM (interview, 08/09/2015).

The ultimate goal of closed meeting is preparing by name by address strategy (Triantini, 2015). Each member of winning team must to identify and conditioning registered voter name in fixed voters list (DPT) in each polling station (TPS) who are willing to choose their candidate. The winning team, then, will bring its record to candidate. Each candidate has own mechanism to verify this record. It is a basis for each candidate to spread money to the voters. However, according to EPU, “this record is not a war guide. It’s just a picture that describing my effort to win election. In the last minute, leave the picture into your box, then see what is happen in the war arena. As a fighter, if someone sell, I will buy it” (interview, 10/09/2015).

Generally, the winning team will prioritize their extended family as primary candidate supporter. After that, they will record voter in the outside of their extended family. “I go door to door. I asked to family head, how many voters in this house. If they do not know what should be choose in election day, then I ask to all family member who has been registered to choose my candidate. If they know who should be choose in election day, for example this household has five voters, then I ask them to give me one or two voters to choose my candidate. Three voters as vote rest could be given to other candidate”, said Wawan, member of EPU winning team (interview, 20/06/2015).

Door to door strategy also performed by winning team of other candidates. Consequently, each winning team cannot avoid data duplication (one registered voter is recorded by two or more candidate winning team). “If you meet an honest voter, they will inform us that they were already listed as supporter of candidate A or B. Unfortunately, most voter are not willing to open this information due to secret norm in general elections”, said Hepi, winning team of PPP candidate (interview, 06/27/2015). Each candidate has different target in certain village. In one village, EPU has targeted his winning team to get 500 votes (Wawan, interview, 20/06/2015). UR, non-incumbent candidate from Partai Demokrat, also ask to his winning team to get 500 votes (Bi’ul, interview, 06/09/2015). While Hepi, winning team of PPP candidate, is only charged to get 50 votes in one polling station (interview, 06/27/2015).

5. Recruiting and training witnesses

Witness is someone who received mandate from parties official to supervise process of voting and vote counting at polling stations. Each political party may submit only one witnesses into the polling area. In Ogan Ilir, official party witnesses are popular with the term of *saksidalam* (inside witness). In addition, there is also the term of *saksiluar* (outside witness) who received informal mandate from certain candidates to mobilize voters, supervising process in polling station, and reporting election result directly to candidate.

Each political party has a different mechanism for managing and training witnesses in polling stations. Party officials tend to prioritize their cadre in village level as inside witness. Party official is also responsible for inside witness financing. While outside witness is depending primarily on candidate financial strength. In Ogan Ilir 1, outside witness will receive Rp50,000 and inside witness will gets Rp100,000 and logistic (food, snacks, drinks, cigarettes, and mobile phone credit). According to WM, incumbent candidate from PDIP, “a witness is a spearhead in election day. They should not be hungry and sluggish. His body, eyes, and minds must be literate for 24 hours” (interview, 09/08/2015).

6. Using the quiet period

Normatively, quiet period can be defining as period where all campaign activity is prohibited. In fact, this is a moment for all candidate to practicing vote buying. From all successful candidates are interviewed, all of them provide Rp100,000 per voter, including voters who are conditioned through a network of family or friendship. This value is excluding transportation cost for winning team who has job to distribute this money to the voters. Only AS, non-incumbent candidate from NasDem, gives Rp50,000 per voter. Helmi (member of AS winning team in TanjungDayang Selatan village) has explanation for this value. “As a public figure in Ogan Ilir, AS want to measure his supporter loyalty. I think, it’s relate to next pilkada in Ogan Ilir”, said Helmi (interview, 25/09/2015). For AS, non-incumbent candidate from NasDem, it is important to highlight that general election is not about money. “You can make analysis. I get the voters with Rp50.000, while others candidate buysit with higher price (Rp100,000). The question is why do they persist choose me even though they receive less money that other voters? There must be something

behind this voter attitude. Something that certainly is not money”, said AS (interview, 26/09/2015).

In Ogan Ilir 1, vote buying is starting at quite period until voters go to polling station. Off course, each candidate winning team do not move silently. "In quiet period, our village look like a market. The winning team member is very busy to distribute white envelope to voters. Voters who felt his name has been recorded by a certain winning team will participated actively to get a white envelope. They claim candidate or winning team promise. In election day, most people choose not to go to their rubber plantation, because they get additional income. Imagine that if a household have four voters, then they will get Rp400,000 in that day as additional income. That is just from one candidate”, said Wawan (20/06/2015). In this situation, Election Supervisory Officers (PPL) at village level is powerless. “He just watching the game. But, don’t worry, there is special envelope for PPL officer”, said Hepi (interview, 20/06/2015).

7. Monitoring vote tabulation as it moves through the system

In election day, an inside witness goes to polling station at 6 am. She must show letter of assignment from party official to polling station official. She will receive official ID card from polling station official. Several inside witnesses have official uniform from their party. Voting process at polling station will take place from 7.00 am – 13.00 pm. Polling station officer will start counting result of election after 13.00 pm and finished at 17.00 pm. However, overall administration process at polling station will completed at night (usually at 20.00 pm). All witnesses will get C1 Appendix which contain general election result at polling station.

C1 Appendix is a document that more valuable than money and gold at election day. High competition among candidate within and between political party make all candidate to analyze C1 Appendix earlier. Each candidate prepares special team to collect and tabulated it. “I prepared three cars to collect C1 Appendix. One car covering one sub-district”, said WM, incumbent candidates from PDIP (interview, 10/08/2015). NasDem, PAN, Gerindra, and Golkar do similar step. One day after election day, WM disseminate leaflet containing information about 2014 general election result in Ogan Ilir 1. “I do this as reminder to all candidate. My message is simple: do not try to make vote trading with

general election officer at all level, I have Appendix C1 ten hundred percent”, said WM, incumbent candidates from PDIP (interview, 10/08/2015). KMT is a little confusion about 2014 general election because he cannot collect Appendix C1 one hundred percent. “We, as a political party, do not solid even though there is internal agreement about recruiting and financing witnesses. Each candidate runs alone and promote her owns ego and interest”, said KMT (interview,08/10/2015).

8. Monitoring the result

From TPS, TPS officer will give Appendix C1 to *PanitiaPemungutanSuara* (PPS, village-level voting committee). All party witnesses will get the D1 form (a recapitulation of all the polling booth result in the village). PPS, then, bring all D1 form to *PanitiaPemilihan Kecamatan* (PPK, subdistrict election committee). PPK will produce the DA1 form (a recapitulation of all PPS in their area) and send it to *KomisiPemilihanUmum Daerah* (KPUD, Regional General Elections Commission). In this phase, each political party recruit one officer as outside witness to guard all ballot in the KPUD office for eight days. All witnesseswork 24 hours and receive honorarium, logistic, and transportation funds. Off course, there is several police officer in the KPUD office.

9. Getting ready for legal challenge

In Ogan Ilir 1, there is only one dispute on general election result which has been decided by the *MahkamahKonstitusi* (MK, Constitutional Court) through MK decision number: 09-04-07/ PHPU.DPR-Parliament/XII/2014. In this phase, each candidate must bring witnesses and lawyer to MK. Disputed party have to spend extra funding for lawyer and witnesses who had left their families for a few days, including transportation, food, and accommodation in Jakarta.

b. Patronage after election day

Before election day of 2014 election day,patronage practice has dominated by financing winning team, individual and club goods, and vote buying.One year after election day, elected candidate usewedding and death events as a momentum to practicing patronage. It is recorded from selected interview with candidate as follows:

"I almost go to wedding party every week. In Ogan Ilir, wedding schedule was almost uniform, if not Wednesday-Thursday or Saturday-Sunday. In one day, I received three or four wedding invitation. When I come to this invitation, I must give them white envelope. Content of this envelope is money. The amount of money in this envelope is varied and depending on closeness between me and him", said AS, non-incumbent candidate from NasDem (interview, 26/09/2015).

"I always receive wedding invitation. I will be coming as long as I have free time. If I cannot attend to this invitation, I will send a white envelop which contain money to them. For me, attending wedding party is the most effective communication strategy to maintain constituents", said WM, incumbent candidate from PDI-P (interview, 08/09/2015).

Another event is *Ramadhon, Hari Raya Idul Fitri* (Eid al-Fitr), and *Hari Raya Idul Adha* (Eid al-Adha). "I received *Tunjangan Hari Raya* (THR, special incentive for Eid al-Fitr) from EPU (non-incumbent candidate from Golkar", said Wawan (interview 20/06/2015). Jalal, winning team member of DPRD Sumatera Selatan candidate (DPRD, South Sumatera Province Parliament) said that he receives THR every year before Eid al-Fitr celebration (interview, 21/09/2015). Helmi, winning team member of AS (non-incumbent candidate from NasDem, said that he never received THR. "I would contact him if there are personal that I cannot tackle alone and need help from AS", said Helmi (interview, 28/06/2015).

Based on candidate point of view, particularly elected candidate, it is time to begin using their power to oversee proposed development project. "In the past, my position is very weak. We lost in *Pilkada* 2010 (*Pilkada*, General Election of Head Region). My party, PDIP, has weak opposition relate to Golkarpower in executive and legislative. Now, I am a vice chairman of DPRD Ogan Ilir. I have strong position to determine budget allocation and bringing project to my constituent", said WM, incumbent candidate from PDIP (interview, 09/08/2015). KMT is also trying to keep care activity to their constituent. "I provide one sheep to my constituent in one village for Eid al-Adha celebration. Sacrifice is the way to maintain vertical relation (with the God) and horizontal relation (with my voters)", said KMT (interview, 10/08/2015).

In Stoke (2011) views, our finding show that how non-programmatic approach dominated patronage praxis in Ogan Ilir 1. It is also supporting Allen (2014, pp. 221-245) who said that political elite and ordinary people have the same opportunity to become subject of patronage. In our case, candidates get political support and voters get material and

immaterial benefits. Patronage praxis after election day show that patronage is never ending cycle. It does not stop when general election is end. Candidate maintain their constituent through patronage. We also agree with Aspinall (2011, pp. 289-319) who noted that patronage is a trump for identity politics. In our case, patronage is prerequisite for candidate to winning election even though she has a broad social networking and more popular than another candidate.

Conclusion

Money politics is empirical problem in Indonesia. Based on patronage approach, this research is devoted to understanding this problem and attempt to answer three questions: how to explain the candidate strategy to winning the 2014 General Elections in Ogan Ilir districts? Does the candidate have similar or different strategy to get political support from the voters? Do they still use patronage to maintain positive relationship with their constituency?

From the previous section, the researcher concludes that: (a) the implementation of the 2014 election in the electoral district of Ogan Ilir 1 tinged with political patronage conducted before and after the elections. Before the day of the elections, patronage practices embodied in the form of transport allowance, honorarium, cash consumption, relief goods to the community, and the utilization of the funds aspirations of councilors South Sumatra Province. Post-election, patronage is manifested in the form of donations at weddings, deaths, and the celebration of Islam days; (b) the practice of patronage began to happen when the candidates form a winning team, socialize, and vote buying; (c) networking family, particularly the extended family, and friendship is the foundation of the main candidates to build a winning team structure. However, the voices of the voters successfully conditioned to by 'by name by address' strategy; (d) elected candidate still continue practicing patronage as a tool for maintaining their constituent.

This research has several limitations. *First*, it is true that this research shows how *the Nine Step to Victory* is very useful framework to understanding the candidate and the voter behavior based on sequential principle and the candidate point of view. However, this framework should be combine to another approach to capture the complexity of local political landscape in the general election atmosphere. For example, this framework could be combine using Cultural Theory or Narrative Approach to understand local politics issues vigorously. To complement this

approach, it is important to build a sequential framework based on the voter point of view as a part of knowledge on Indonesian voter behavior.

Second, the researcher does not explain programmatic approach in Ogan Ilir 1. Conversely, he only focusing his study to elected candidate-broker relation in individual level. In his minds, as shown by WM statement in the above, local politician in Ogan Ilir District also request government projects so that they can maintain their constituent through government funds. This statement, then, open a research question on programmatic approach praxis at district level. The next research should be elaborated in the next research.

Third, network is the essence relation between the candidate, broker, and voter. This research fails to visualize this network because he does not apply *Social Network Analysis* (SNA). In the future, SNA should be considered as an approach and method to understanding patronage network at grass root level. For example, SNA could help the researcher to determine “who connect with whom” and “who is the central actors within voter’s network”. Visualizing patronage network into graphic give opportunity for the researcher to get more intuitions.

Fourth, when all party official perceives women quota (30% from total DCT) as administrative prerequisite, this research did not interview a women candidate, a women broker, or a women voter. It, then, fail to capture the voice of women as a candidate, a broker, or a voter. Does the man prefer than the women when adopting patronage as political strategy? Does the women candidate considered sex and gender attribute when recruit a broker? The next research should prioritize this issue because there are two women (5 percent) in Ogan Ilir District House of Representative (*DPRD Kabupaten Ogan Ilir*) as the winner of the 2014 General Elections.

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